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GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 381 (Europe sec) (TS-F)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 381 (31 JUL 51)JSPOG

31 JUL 51

SUBJECT: Planning for Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces

TO: Chief
Military Assistance Advisory Group
APO 63

AG-0x 37/19

1. This headquarters is exploring the manner in which the Chinese Nationalist forces might be employed, offensively or defensively, or both, against the Chinese Communist forces in event the proper authority in the United States determines such employment to be in the United States national interest.

2. Suitable areas for their defensive employment as now envisioned would include Formosa in event of Chinese Communist attack and Korea as an augmentation to United Nations forces.

3. Offensively, the Nationalists could be employed with United Nations forces in Korea and also in the following manner:

a. Amphibious raids on the mainland by limited force (up to division strength) supported by United States naval and air forces with the objectives of:

(1) Detracting from Chinese Communist prestige.

(2) Inducing the Communists to deploy additional forces to the area.

(3) Disrupting means of communications.

(4) Supplying and encouraging guerrilla forces.

(5) Destroying Chinese Communist forces and supplies.

(6) Ascertaining the nature of the reception that might be given to Chinese Nationalist forces if they undertake major operations on the mainland.

AG RECORDS
E. K. W

Hq FEC TS Control # 1063-56-1

Hq AFFE/8A (REAR)
TS Control Number
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b. Invasion of the mainland by major Chinese Nationalist forces supported by United States naval and air forces with the objectives of:

(1) Seizing a beachhead in a suitable area south of the Yangtze River.

(2) Eventually establishing Chinese Nationalist control of China south of the Yangtze.

4. Your radio MG 7054 of 29 May 1951 has indicated clearly that much remains to be done before the Chinese Nationalist forces will be adequately equipped and trained for major offensive operations. It is not contemplated that the Chinese Nationalists would be deployed on the mainland against forces of a calibre equal to the Chinese Communist units now in Korea but initially only against units such as those which have been withdrawn from the Korean front and are in process of reorganizing. A major invasion would not be mounted until there is a reasonable probability that Chinese Nationalist forces would receive considerable support from guerrillas and the native population.

5. It is requested that you provide this headquarters, for planning purposes, your views upon the courses of action of paragraphs 2 and 3 and, assuming adequate United States naval and air support, your estimates upon the following:

a. Under the present program with no additional acceleration of equipping from the Zone of Interior,

(1) By what dates could there be ready for employment in Korea a force of one RCT; one division; two divisions; three divisions?

(2) By what dates could there be ready for employment in amphibious raids on the China coast a force of one RCT; one division, two divisions; three divisions?

(3) What is the optimum force that could be made available for major offensive operations on the China mainland and by what date could it be ready?

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b. Under an augmented program assigned a high priority, what would be the potential of the Chinese Nationalist forces in regard to the questions of paragraph 5a (1), (2) and (3)?

c. Assuming the United States will continue its commitment with regard to preventing an invasion of Formosa, what would be the effect upon the defenses of Formosa of undertaking the suggested actions?

6. Consideration of this problem should, of course, be limited to the minimum number of your staff and the fact of its consideration must not in any case be divulged to other than United States military personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISPATCHED
3 JUL 1951
GHQ-FEC
AGO

I certify that I have reviewed this document and determined that it cannot be downgraded as of this date. 28 MAR 1956
(Date)

A. T. Netterblad Jr.
(Name, Grade, Title)

A. T. NETTERBLAD JR.
LT COL GS
G-3 EXECUTIVE OFFICER
HQ AFFE/8A (REAR)

I certify that I have reviewed this document and determined that it cannot be downgraded as of this date. 12 Apr 56
(Date)

Norman E Cole Lt Col G3 Div
(Name, Grade, Title)

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